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Do Sexually Violent Predator Laws
Violate Double Jeopardy or Substantive
Due Process?
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
Tamara Rice Lave & Justin McCrary†
Where the State has “disavowed any punitive intent”; limited
confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous
individuals . . . and permitted immediate release upon a showing that
the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot
say that it acted with punitive intent.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 19971
It is the lack of an empirical footing that is and has always been the
Achilles heel of constitutional law, not the lack of a good
constitutional theory.
Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, 19982

INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Supreme Court held that the sexually
violent predator (SVP) act in Kansas did not violate double
†

Tamara Rice Lave, Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Stanford
Law School; B.A., Haverford College. Justin McCrary, Professor, University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law. Ph.D., Economics, University of California, Berkeley; B.A.,
Princeton University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Olin
Conference on Law and Economics of Criminal Law at the University of Virginia in
March 2010. A more recent version was presented at the Conference of Empirical Legal
Studies at Northwestern University in November 2011. Co-authorship of this article was
facilitated by the Center for Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley
where Tamara was a visiting scholar in the summer of 2011 and 2012. We would
particularly like to thank the following individuals for their insightful comments and
criticisms: David Abrams, Kathy Barnes, Joshua Fischman, Michael Froomkin, Dan Ho,
Brandon Garnett, Richard Hynes, John Klick, J.J. Prescott, David Sklansky, Jordan
Steiker, Bob Weisberg, and Frank Zimring.
1
521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (holding that the Kansas sexually violent
predator law did not violate the U.S. Constitution).
2
Richard A. Posner, Madison Lecture: Against Constitutional Theory, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998).
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jeopardy or substantive due process even though it indefinitely
commits an individual to a locked state-run facility after that
individual has completed a maximum prison term. In this article,
we question a core empirical foundation for the Court’s holding in
Hendricks: that SVPs are so dangerous that they will commit
repeat acts of sexual violence if they are not confined. Our
findings suggest that SVP laws have had no discernible impact on
the incidence of sex crimes. These results challenge the only
constitutionally permissible justification for SVP legislation, and
they imply that states could more effectively reduce sex crimes by
allocating these resources elsewhere. Our argument merits
particular attention because we are not asking the Court to
reconsider evidence previously presented but deemed insufficient;
instead, we are urging the Court to consider evidence that was
not yet available when Hendricks was decided.
The majority began its analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks by
noting that in narrow circumstances, “an individual’s
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint
may be overridden even in the civil context.”3 To justify such a
commitment, the state must prove that the individual is dangerous
and suffers from mental illness or a mental abnormality:
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a
sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment . . . [C]ivil commitment statutes [have been sustained]
when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of
some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental
abnormality.” These added statutory requirements serve to limit
involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.4

The SVP act in Kansas met both of these requirements.5
Currently twenty states6 and the federal government
have laws calling for the involuntary civil commitment of SVPs.
3

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
5
The Kansas SVP Act requires the state to prove that a person (1) has been
convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense, and (2) suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes it likely he will commit a future
sexually violent offense. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a02 (West 2012).
6
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
For a detailed discussion of each of these statutes including date of passage and
procedural protections, see Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing away the Key: Has the Adam
Walsh Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 409 (2011).
4

2013]

SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS

1393

As of the summer of 2008, at least 4446 individuals were confined
nationwide pursuant to SVP laws.7 Two years earlier, the total
civil commitment budget across the country equaled $454.7
million, with states spending an average of $94,017 per year on
each committed SVP.8
SVP laws allow the state to use civil law to lock people
away in circumstances that constitute the functional equivalent of
punishment. They are forced to reside in secure facilities with
armed guards,9 are not free to leave and are subject to important
limitations regarding diet, visitors, and activities. Most
significantly, they have no idea when, or if, they will ever be
released.10 Given that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar
the state from punishing a person twice for the same crime and
that SVP laws are designed to specifically target individuals who
have served their maximum prison sentence, the classification of
7

This number was calculated using data that we received directly from
seventeen states. For the three states that did not provide us data (Florida, Nebraska,
and Pennsylvania) and for the state that did not provide us complete data
(Massachusetts), we used data that was published by the Washington State Institute
for Public Policy. KATHY GOOKIN, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED
1 (August 2007), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=07-08-1101. That
study reported that the number of persons held under SVP laws in 2006 totaled 4534.
Because that data was collected in 2006, and since the laws are still in effect, we are
assuming that these states have more committed SVP’s now than they did then. For
instance, a recent article in the Star Tribune stated that there are currently 650
persons committed under Minnesota’s SVP law, and one has just been granted release.
Paul McEnroe, First Sex Offender from State Program is Granted Release, STAR TRIB.,
(Feb. 3, 2012, 11:32 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/138669904.html. For
another article about sex offender commitments, see Monica Davey & Abby
Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html.
8
See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at 5.
9
See id. at 1; ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL
VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 21-22 (2006); see
also Brief for Leroy Hendricks, Cross Petitioner, at 19, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (“Instead of receiving treatment in a therapeutic setting,
respondent is incarcerated in a Department of Corrections facility, in a setting
indistinguishable from his former convict status, and denied the privileges given to
civilly committed inmates in Kansas.”). For a representative look at a treating
hospital, see Cal. Dep’t of State Hosps., DSH—Coalinga: Security, CA.GOV,
http://www.dsh.ca.gov/Coalinga/Security.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (describing the
“state-of-the-art security system” that surrounds the hospital and lists security
measures such as random shakedowns, metal detectors, and uniforms of inmates. “[A]ll
patients are constantly and directly supervised.”).
10
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64 (“Hendricks focuses on his confinement’s
potentially indefinite duration as evidence of the State’s punitive intent. That focus,
however, is misplaced. Far from any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is
instead linked to the stated purpose of the commitment, namely, to hold the person
until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.”); see also
JANUS, supra note 9, at 22.

1394

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

the law as civil or criminal is critical. If the SVP law were
classified as criminal, it would constitute an impermissible second
punishment.11 If the law is civil, however, the state may continue
to hold these individuals because the prohibition on double
jeopardy would not apply.12
In Hendricks, the Court accepted the state’s classification
of the law as civil in large part because the justices simply
presumed as true the legislature’s empirical claim that SVPs are
“extremely dangerous”13 and their “likelihood of engaging in
repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high.”14 The rationale
for the law could not be deterrence, the Court reasoned, because it
empirically assumed SVPs could not be deterred;15 nor could it be
retributive, because the only purpose for introducing prior
criminal history was to show the presence of a mental disorder or
dangerousness. Even though the state’s civil commitment scheme
involved indefinite confinement,16 the Court argued that the
legislative findings justified such confinement because, “[f]ar from
any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is instead
linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold
the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to
be a threat to others.”17

11

In Ex parte Lange, the Court explained the principle behind double jeopardy:

If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is
that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence.
And . . . there has never been any doubt of its entire and complete protection
of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the
same facts, for the same statutory offence.
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
12
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (discussing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966), in which the Court “expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow the
expiration of a prison term without offending double jeopardy principles.”).
13
Id. at 351.
14
Id.
15
The Court explained why the legislature could not have intended that the
Act deter SVPs:
Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function as a
deterrent. Those persons committed under the Act are, by definition,
suffering from a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” that
prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such
persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.
Id. at 362-63.
16
The Court used the term “affirmative restraint” because it is one of the factors
from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), that is used to distinguish
criminal from civil statutes. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 394 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17
Id. at 363 (majority opinion).
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Many have criticized the Court’s holding in Hendricks.18
Eli Rollman argues that several factors show that the law should
be considered criminal, including “the fact that implementation of
the Act is delayed until the ‘anticipated release’ of a prisoner,
thereby lessening the effect of any treatment while
simultaneously maximizing punishment.”19 Andrew Campbell
criticizes the majority for allowing the states to “[m]erely redefine
any measure which is claimed to be punishment as ‘regulation,’
and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its
imposition.”20 Others have focused their attention on the nebulous
quality of a “mental abnormality.”21 The American Psychiatric
Association created a taskforce to evaluate SVP laws and
concluded that, “sexual predator commitment laws represent a
serious assault on the integrity of psychiatry, particularly with
regard to defining mental illness and the clinical conditions for
compulsory treatment.”22 Still another line of critique focuses on
the use of actuarial instruments to prove dangerousness. Bernard
Harcourt criticizes the actuarial nature of SVP laws for treating
offenders as objects,23 while Richard Wollert24 and Tamara Lave25
contend that we simply do not have the ability to accurately
predict future dangerousness, which means that these states are
locking away people who would not reoffend if released.

18

For a general critique of sexually violent predator laws, see JANUS, supra note
9, at 36-38 (arguing that SVP laws undermine the Constitution’s due process protections by
inappropriately blurring the line between punishment and civil commitment).
19
Eli M. Rollman, Supreme Court Review, “Mental Illness”: A Sexually Violent
Predator is Punished Twice for One Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1013 (1998).
20
Andrew D. Campbell, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning
of Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 87, 87 (1998) (quoting Justice Marshall dissenting in United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 760 (1987)).
21
See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 261 (1998) (arguing that the term “mental abnormality” is
“circularly defined . . . collap[sing] all badness into madness”); Bruce J. Winick, Sex
Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 505, 525-30 (1998) (arguing that the definition of mental abnormality is so
broad that it can apply to any behavior).
22
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 173 (1999).
23
BERNARD E. HARCOURT AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (also contending that the SVP laws are
radically inefficient by focusing resources on rare events).
24
Richard Wollert, Low Base Rates Limit Expert Certainty When Current
Actuarials Are Used to Identify Sexually Violent Predators: An Application of Bayes’s
Theorem, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 56 (2006).
25
Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213 (2011).
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In this article, we expand on these criticisms in a new and
important way. We question whether SVPs are “extremely
dangerous” and thus highly likely to commit violent sex crimes if
released. In our analysis, we use original data gathered directly
from SVP states to review commitments across the country. Next,
using panel data for the last few decades, we examine the impact of
SVP laws on the incidence of sex-related homicide and forcible
rape. We also use data collected in the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (NCANDS) to examine the impact of SVP
legislation on the incidence of non-fatal child sexual abuse.26
Finally, since underreporting poses problems in accurately
measuring the incidence of sex crimes, we also examine gonorrhea
rates, a common proxy for the prevalence of sexual abuse.
We found that SVP laws have had no discernible impact
on the incidence of sex crimes or gonorrhea—a result that carries
enormous constitutional significance.27 If the state cannot justify
its law on incapacitation grounds, then it must offer another
reason for locking these individuals away indefinitely—under the
constraints imposed by the Constitution. The state may not
continue to hold persons in custody who have served their
26

See Nat’l Data Archive on Child Abuse & Neglect, National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (NCANDS), Detailed Case Data Component (DCDC), NDACAN,
http://www.ndacan.cornell.edu/ndacan/Datasets/Abstracts/DatasetAbstract_NCANDS_Gen
eral.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter NCANDS Data].
27
At first glance, it may appear that our methodology is ruled out by
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court held that even if a large
scientific study showed the death penalty had a racially discriminatory impact, a
petitioner must still show that the discrimination was purposeful. Unlike in McCleskey,
however, we are not using statistics to make an equal protection argument but instead
to examine whether SVP law is civil or criminal. If the state cannot justify SVP law on
non-punitive grounds, then it must be struck down as a violation of double jeopardy. In
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed Green’s
conviction for first degree murder on the grounds that it constituted double jeopardy.
Justice Black explained why the framers considered double jeopardy such a serious
infringement of a person’s rights:
The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to
protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible
conviction more than once for an alleged offense. . .The underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
355 U.S. 184, 187-88. Therefore it does not make sense to argue that individual SVPs
must make a showing particular to their case, because if the law is not constitutional,
then the state is barred from trying to commit anyone under it in the first place.
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maximum prison sentence under a justification that they deserve
additional custody to pay for their crimes. Nor may the state lock
up persons as SVPs to deter would-be offenders. Both these
reasons are punitive, and they violate double jeopardy.
Furthermore, because SVP laws infringe on a
fundamental liberty interest, they are subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.28 The
Court has consistently held that, to meet the demands of
substantive due process, a civil commitment law must only apply
to individuals who are mentally ill and dangerous.29 Our findings
show that SVP laws are not so narrowly tailored.
We believe that our contribution is methodological,
substantive, and theoretical. Too often in the debate over sex
offender policy, politicians and judges make empirical claims
about sex offenders without ever questioning the veracity of those
claims.30 We hope that by challenging some of those empirical
claims, we will influence more policy makers to do the same.
Secondly, these laws are expressly premised on the claim that
SVPs currently suffer from mental illness, which causes them to
have “serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” thus making
them distinguishable “from the dangerous but typical recidivist.”31
Yet we show that the best available evidence of those in SVP
custody suggests that these individuals are not in fact
distinguishable from the “dangerous but typical recidivist,” which
is pivotal to the distinction between civil and criminal laws.
Finally, there is a robust debate in legal academia regarding the
extent to which courts should defer to legislative findings.32 We
28

“Freedom from physical restraint being a fundamental right, the State
must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not put forward, for such
discrimination against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill.” Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
29
“A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained
civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the
proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (internal citations omitted); see also
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (holding that to civilly commit someone to a
mental institution, the state is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and requires hospitalization for
“his own welfare and protection of others”).
30
See generally Tamara Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism: The Birth and
Centrality of an Urban Legend, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 186, 187-88 (2011).
31
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
32
See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative
Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that legislatures are poorly suited for
gathering and evaluating facts impartially, especially when considering legislation
restricting controversial or minority rights and thus advocating that courts should

1398

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

hope that our article will lend support to the importance of
independent fact-finding, especially when fundamental rights of
unpopular groups are at stake.
Our article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the
theory explaining why SVP laws should have an impact on sex
crimes. In Part II, we introduce the original data that we
gathered to conduct part of our analysis. In Part III, we evaluate
whether SVP laws have resulted in increased commitments, and
in Part IV we analyze whether they have had an impact on the
incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child sexual abuse,
and/or gonorrhea. In Part V, we suggest that our findings are
not surprising in light of the literature on aging and
dangerousness. Part VI briefly explores whether our results are
due at least in part to the state’s inability to accurately predict
who will re-offend, and Part VII is devoted to considering
whether the state might more effectively fight sex crimes by
directing resources elsewhere. Finally, Part VIII discusses the
constitutional implications for our findings.
I.

THEORY: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF SVP LAW FOR
THE RATE OF SEX CRIMES?

SVP laws are explicitly premised on the notion that there
is a small, readily identifiable segment of the population that is
so dangerous that public safety demands they be locked away.33
If this claim were true then we would expect to see what
criminologists term an “incapacitation effect”—in other words,
removing these dangerous people from the community should
discernibly reduce the rate of crimes that they are at risk of

independently review the factual foundation of legislation that curtails basic individual
rights, regardless of whether those rights are subject to heightened scrutiny); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001) (criticizing
the Rehnquist Court for using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress,
including by “transforming what had been considered proper factual questions within
Congress’s purview into legal questions for the Court’s exclusive determination” and
thus “displacing Congress’s proper factfinding role”); John O. McGinnis & Charles W.
Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law: The Courts Versus Congress in Social Fact-Finding,
25 CONST. COMMENT. 69 (2008) (advocating for “independent judicial evaluation of
facts necessary” for assessing the constitutionality of legislation).
33
“The bill is narrowly tailored to focus on the smaller number of habitual
sex offenders who, because of their psychological makeup, pose an immediate danger to
the public as soon as they are released from prison.” In re Care & Treatment of
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 140 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of
State Senator Bob Vancrum before Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb. 22,
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d sub. nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997).
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committing.34 Specifically, we would expect to see a noticeable
decrease in the rate of sexual homicide, forcible rape, and child
sexual abuse.
Of course, it is also possible that SVP laws have an
impact on the incidence of certain crimes because they deter
would-be sex offenders from violating the law. A deterrence
theory is modeled on a rational choice view, which assumes that
if the costs of violating a law are high enough, a person will
choose not to offend.35 This would be the case if a would-be sex
offender decided not to violate the law because he did not want
to risk lifetime commitment as a SVP.
Extensive literature exists on the impact of law on crime,36
and such studies have played an important role in the debate over
the death penalty. Some scholars contend that the death penalty
saves lives,37 but others find no significant evidence of deterrence.38
34

For a general discussion of incapacitation and deterrence, see Daniel S.
Nagin, Deterrence and Incapacitation, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
345-68 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
35
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 162 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (1651) (arguing that the purpose of punishment is to convince people to
obey the law, “If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that
naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is
rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime; Because it is of the
nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which
end (if it be lesse than the benefit of transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a
contrary effect”); CESARE BONESANA & MARCHESE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS (Edward D. Ingraham, trans., 1819) (arguing that “[t]he end of
punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further
injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such
punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will
make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least
torment to the body of the criminal . . . . Crimes are more effectually prevented by the
certainty than the severity of punishment . . . . That a punishment may produce the
effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected
from the crime, including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the
privation of the expected advantage.”); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Macmillan 1948) (1789) (contending that the
purpose of punishment is to dissuade wrongdoing: “the value of the punishment must
not less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the
offense.”).
36
See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995) (exploring how useful the modern
prison is in restraining crime and the effectiveness of incapacitation); Isaac Erlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1972) (an analytical
and empirical examination of the extent of the deterrent effect of law enforcement).
37
See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhish et al., Does Capital Punishment Have
Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 344 (2003) (arguing that each execution results on average in eighteen fewer
murders); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (arguing for the existence of the differential
deterrent effect of capital punishment); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions,
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In a 2005 article in the Stanford Law Review, John J. Donohue and
Justin Wolfers tested the robustness of these studies, ultimately
concluding that, “existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly
fragile.”39 Other scholars argue that the death penalty actually
increases the murder rate.40 In 2012, however, the National
Academy of Sciences published a report in which they found that
there is insufficient evidence from the research conducted to date to
show definitively whether the death penalty has an impact of any
kind on the homicide rate.41
Although we use many of the same methodologies to
evaluate the impact of SVP legislation, our analysis contains a key
difference as compared to the death penalty debate. Even if the
death penalty does not deter murder, it may still be constitutional.
A proponent of capital punishment could argue that the death
penalty is justified because the offender deserves it; indeed, a
retributivist would argue that deterrence is irrelevant to what
punishment a person should receive.42 A proponent of SVP laws, in
contrast, cannot ignore that the laws may have no incapacitation
effect. Such a proponent would not be able to say that a SVP
deserves to be locked away based on the severity of the SVP’s
underlying conduct because that would be a punitive rationale,
which would make the laws criminal and not civil. Deterrence is
also a punitive rationale,43 which means that a proponent cannot

Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004) (arguing that a
state execution deters approximately fourteen murders per year on average).
38
See, e.g., Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003) (arguing that there is little systematic
evidence that the execution rate influences the crime rate).
39
John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence
in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005).
40
See, e.g., John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, Deterrence and
Brutalization: The Dual Effects of Executions, 17 JUST. Q. 685 (2000) (finding an
increase in the level of argument-based murders of strangers in the period following
execution); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital
Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005) (showing
rate of murder increased in thirteen states following executions).
41
COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE AT THE NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY, REPORT BRIEF 2 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper, eds. Apr. 2012),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NatResCouncil-Deterr.pdf.
42
“Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all
cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime . . . .”
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd, trans.,
2d ed. 1999) (1797) (emphasis added).
43
“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than
the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the
consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.” Jeremy
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justify SVP legislation under the theory that it dissuades other
would-be sex offenders from violating the law. In a criminal
law regime, the state may not imprison someone subsequent to
serving the maximum jail sentence—as SVPs by definition
have—because the additional time would constitute a second
punishment for the same crime and thus violate the Fifth
Amendment ban on double jeopardy.
A.

How Much of an Impact Should We Expect?

Evaluating the impact of SVP laws on the incidence of
forcible rape and sex-related homicide requires taking a stance on
the counterfactual—what would have happened to rates of crime
and sexual abuse in SVP states had these laws never been passed?
Taking a stance is necessary because the estimated impact of the
law is the gap between the observed prevalence of crime or sexual
abuse and the prevalence shown in the counterfactual. In this
context, approximating the counterfactual is complicated by two
factors. First, most SVP laws were passed during a period of
decreasing crime in the United States.44 Thus, it is easy for a
simplistic analysis to conflate the effect of SVP passage on the
incidence of crime and sexual abuse with secular trends in crime.
Crime and disorder are lower after SVP passage than before, but
this holds true for states that have not passed any SVP law.
Second, states that passed SVP legislation are not necessarily
comparable to states that did not. In particular, these two groups of
states might have had rates of crime and sexual abuse that
differed, even if no SVP law had been enacted.
To address these difficulties, we focus on two research
designs. The first of these is a difference-in-differences design
that compares the incidence of crime, for example, between
SVP and non-SVP states after passage, to create a benchmark
for how different crime would have been had no SVP law ever
been passed. The benchmark taken is the difference in the
incidence of crime between SVP and non-SVP states before
passage. The core assumption behind this method is that the
difference between the counterfactual prevalence of crime in
SVP states and observed prevalence of crime in non-SVP states
Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (John
Bowring ed. 1843).
44
See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE
(2006) (documenting and discussing theories that explain the American crime decline
of the 1990s).
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does not change over time. Our second approach is a
generalization of the difference-in-differences approach that
takes advantage of the idiosyncratic timing of the year each
state passed SVP legislation. This second approach supplements
the use of non-SVP states as a control group by using the
prevalence of crime in an SVP state prior to SVP passage. This
method fully exploits the assumption of no anticipatory
behavior, by which we mean that SVP laws should not affect
the prevalence of crime until after date of passage.
As is the case with many empirical examinations of the
social impact of law, our results are subject to statistical
imprecision. Overall, however, our estimates are consistent with
SVP laws having no discernible deterrent or incapacitation effects.
We use the existing literature to assess the statistical
power delivered by this design.
B.

Does Underreporting Distort our Results?

Many contend that the rate of underreporting in sex
cases is high,45 which means that our results could be skewed
downwards as a result. To get around this potential problem,
we also analyze whether SVP laws have had an impact on the
incidence of gonorrhea, as it is frequently used as a proxy for
the incidence of sexual abuse. Sue Whaitiri and Patrick Kelly
studied all children seen at an Auckland, New Zealand hospital
since 1992 who had been diagnosed with genital gonorrhea.
They found that at least forty percent of these children had
gotten the disease through sexual abuse.46 Sten Vermund and
others studied medical screening data collected on 2521
adolescents at entry into juvenile detention facilities in New
York City between 1983 and 1984, and they found that a
45

See, e.g., Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting After
Reforms: Have Times Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150 (2005);
Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results
From a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 7 (2003);
Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 9 (1989);
Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression
and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J.
COUNSELING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL., 162-70 (1987); John J. Sloan III et al., Assessing
the Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act of 1999: An Analysis of the Victim
Reporting Practices of College and University Students, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 148,
158 (1997) (finding that only 22 percent of rape and 17 percent of sexual assaults were
reported to local law enforcement, campus police or security or other authorities). For a
critical discussion of underreporting in sex crimes, see Lave, supra note 25, at 221-24.
46
Sue Whaitiri & Patrick Kelly, Genital Gonorrhea in Children: Determining the
Source and Mode of Infection, ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD, 96, 247-51 (2009).
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history of sexual abuse was strongly correlated with gonorrhea
or syphilis.47
C.

How Much of an Impact Is Required for SVP Laws to be
Constitutional?

In Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld SVP
legislation under the theory that the state had the right to lock
up persons who suffer from a mental disorder that causes them
to be “extremely dangerous.”48 To assess whether this claim is
true, however, we must have some way of quantifying what
“extremely dangerous” means. In other words, how dangerous
must a person be for the Constitution to allow the state to lock
that person away?
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court attempted to clarify the
Hendricks standard for “mental abnormality” or “personality
disorder,” which originally required that the disorder make it
“difficult if not impossible for the person to control his
behavior.”49 Michael Crane, a convicted sex offender, appealed
his commitment as a SVP. The Kansas Supreme Court
overturned the commitment because no finding had been made
at trial that Crane was unable to control his dangerous
behavior, as required under the U.S. Constitution by
Hendricks.50 The state of Kansas appealed, arguing that the
Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the holding in
Hendricks too restrictively.51 In a 7-2 decision, the Court agreed
and vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment.52
Even though the Hendricks opinion had specifically
described the Kansas law as being akin to laws that provided
for the “forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to
control their behavior,”53 the Court now held that the state did
47

Sten H. Vermund et al., History of Sexual Abuse in Incarcerated
Adolescents with Gonorrhea or Syphilis, 11 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 449 (1990);
see also Stephen C. Boos, Abuse Detection and Screening, in CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND CASE MANAGEMENT 10
(Marilyn Strachan Peterson & Michael Durfee eds. 2003) (“[D]iseases such as
gonorrhea, syphilis, chlamydia, genital herpes and genital warts usually have the same
implication in children as in adults. Sexually transmitted diseases require an
evaluation for sexual abuse.”); Kristen Alexander et al., Interviewing Children, in
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra.
48
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).
49
Id. at 358 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-20a02(b) (1994)).
50
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
51
Id. at 409.
52
Id. at 415.
53
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).
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not need to prove an inability to control.54 Yet the Court did not
adopt Kansas’s position that a person could be committed as a
SVP “without any lack of control determination.”55 Instead, it
held that the standard was “proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior.”56 The Court noted that a large population
of the prison population is mentally ill.57 To ensure that the
confinement remains civil and not criminal, the Court stated
that the SVP must be distinguishable from other sex offenders:
“The severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose
serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist
convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”58
The holdings in Hendricks and Crane highlight the
constitutional significance of our analysis. According to
Hendricks, the only legally permissible justification for SVP
laws is that SVPs suffer from mental illness, which makes
them so dangerous that they need to be incapacitated. It would,
however, constitute double jeopardy to send them to a locked
mental hospital to make them pay for having committed
reprehensible crimes or to discourage others from committing
similar crimes. Crane establishes how dangerous these
offenders must be in order for the SVP law to withstand
heightened substantive due process scrutiny. Their inability to
control must be sufficient to distinguish them from the
“dangerous but typical recidivist.” Thus, if our analysis shows
that SVP laws have had little influence on the rate of sexrelated homicide, forcible rape, or child sexual abuse, then
there is reason to call into question the only constitutionally
permissible rationale for the laws.
II.

DATA

To conduct these analyses, we gathered data from states
on SVP commitments. We also gathered data from national
crime databases on the incidence of forcible rape and sexual
homicide.59 For data on child sexual abuse, we turned to records
54
55
56
57
58
59

Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 412.
Id.
See infra notes 69-70.
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collected in the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System
(NCANDS).60 Our gonorrhea data came from the Center for
Disease Control.61 The purpose of this section is mostly
descriptive, however, we also analyze whether SVP laws have
actually resulted in increased commitments or whether they
are purely symbolic. We find that SVP passage has had a
strong effect on rates of commitment.
A.

Commitment Data from the States

On August 12, 2008, one of the authors, Lave, wrote to
the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers and
requested data on SVP commitments. The Association was
unable to provide information, however, they did give contact
information for each SVP state. Lave then wrote to each state
and requested information on SVP commitments. Each state
required more than one contact to provide information, and
typically, there were several email exchanges and often a
phone conversation. Some states required requests in writing,
and California mandated a formal FOIA request.
We received commitment data by year from sixteen of
the twenty SVP states: Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington and
Wisconsin. Because Massachusetts only provided one year’s worth
of data, for 2009, we supplemented the data using the number of
commitments (121) reported by the Washington State Institute
for Public Policy.62 Overall, we received information on the date of
commitment for close to 1000 individuals.
It should be noted that the total number of
commitments reported by each of these sixteen states differed
from the total number of commitments reported by the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy.63 Since we did not
have access to the underlying data used by Washington State, it
is unclear whether the inconsistency is due in part to differing
definitions of “committed”—whether it is people who are
pending commitment hearings or only those who have already
60

See infra note 71.
See infra note 72.
62
See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at exhibit 1.
63
For instance, Gookin reported that, as of 2006, there were 305 commitments in
Washington State, 161 in Kansas, 342 in Minnesota, 500 in Wisconsin, 414 in Arizona, 558
in California, 307 in Illinois, 75 in North Dakota, 69 in Iowa, 342 in New Jersey, 119 in
South Carolina, 143 in Missouri, 69 in Texas, and 37 in Virginia. Id. at 3-4.
61
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been formally adjudicated to be SVPs. As will be explained in
more detail below, this inconsistency in the number of
commitments does not impact the validity of our results.
In addition, we received age data from thirteen states.
For eleven of these states (Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin), we were able to calculate the
age of commitment and the current age for each SVP. Two
states, Minnesota and North Dakota, provided the age range
of those committed.
Despite repeated requests, we did not receive any data
from Florida, Nebraska, or Pennsylvania. According to a 2007
report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy,
these states did commit individuals as SVPs.64 As of 2006,
Florida had 942 SVP commitments, while Nebraska had
eighteen and Pennsylvania had twelve.65
Table 166 shows the passage date for each SVP law, the
nature of commitment in each state, and the number of people
committed and released based on the data that we received. Unless
otherwise specified, that date is August 2008. As indicated above,
we were unable to gather commitment information from Florida,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, and so that
information comes from the Washington State Institute for Public
Policy.67 Where available, we also include information on the 2006
civil commitment budget for each state, which comes from the
same Washington State report.68
B.

Crime and Gonorrhea Data

We gathered our crime data from two primary, publiclyavailable sources. The forcible rape data is provided by a
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations,
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) website.69 The sex homicide data
comes from the UCR Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR)
available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political

64

Id. at exhibit 1.
Id. at 3.
66
Table 1 can be found in the appendix at the end of this article.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics,
UCRDATATOOL.GOV, www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
65
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and Social Research (ICPSR) website.70 Since there is no special
classification for “sex related homicide” in the SHR, we
combined three types of homicides to create the sex-related
homicide category: rape, other sex offenses, and prostitution or
vice. For both forcible rape and sex-related homicide, we used
data from 1976 to 2009.
Although child sexual abuse is not a UCR specified
crime, data is available from the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (NCANDS).71 We use data from the
NCANDS for 1990 through 2008. NCANDS does not contain
criminal records, but instead contains data collected by the
Department of Health and Human Services.
The data on gonorrhea is from the Center for Disease
Control.72 In conducting our analyses, we used data from 1984
to 2008.
III.

DID SVP LEGISLATION ACTUALLY RESULT IN INCREASED
COMMITMENTS?

Before we analyze whether SVP laws have had an effect
on the incidence of sex crimes, we must first establish that people
have actually been committed pursuant to these laws. To do that,
as explained above, we gathered data from SVP states regarding
the number of commitments per year under the program.
We then ran a regression of commitments in a given
state and year on a series of dummy variables for the states, for
the years, and dummy variables corresponding to the leads and
lags of SVP passage date. More details on the regression
specification and the definition of the dummies are given in
Part V, below. The coefficients from this regression are
displayed in the figures below. The x-axis corresponds to years
since SVP passage; hence zero is the year of SVP passage. The
y-axis gives the number of commitments, relative to the
number of commitments in year of SVP passage.

70

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA:
SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS (2009), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/30767?q=supplementary+homicide+reports&permit%5B0%5D=
AVAILABLE.
71
The Children’s Bureau at the Department of Health and Human Services
collects child abuse and neglect data from the states. It requests data from Child and
Protective Services. The data is supplied voluntarily. See NCANDS Data, supra note 26.
72
Sexually Transmitted Disease Morbidity, 1984–2008 Archive Request, CDC
WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/std-v2008.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
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Figure 1 shows convincingly that SVP passage had a
strong effect on commitments, with roughly fifteen to twenty
new commitments per year in the years following passage. This
is either a low or a high number, depending on notions of the
latent criminality of those committed. This figure is similar in
organization to a variety of such figures we present below, so it
is worth describing this figure in some detail. The open circles
correspond to estimates of the effect of SVP passage on the
outcome—here, SVP commitments—leading up to and
subsequent to SVP passage. The dashed lines convey the scope
of uncertainty surrounding these estimates because we have a
sample of information, rather than the universe of possible
information. These are standard in the empirical legal studies
literature. The figure shows that the estimates leading up to
SVP passage should be approximately zero if the timing of SVP
passage is essentially random. A trend in the pre-passage
estimates would be consistent with trends in the outcome
predicting the date of SVP passage, which is inconsistent with
the maintained assumption that the timing of SVP passage is
random. Here, there is little indication of SVP commitments
prior to SVP passage—that is, the pre-passage estimates are
essentially zero. This indicates the robustness of our
methodology, since the technique should not estimate any
effect of SVP passage on commitments prior to SVP passage.
The post-passage estimates represent our best guess regarding
the effect of SVP passage on the cumulative annual increase in
SVP commitments in a typical state. SVP commitments
increased roughly linearly in time, suggesting that there is a
constant rate of inflow into SVP confinement.
We return to methodological detail below and for now focus
on the substantive interpretation of the estimated effects of SVP
passage on commitments. Regarding the level, our data likely
underestimates the number of commitments, since the data was
directly provided by states. Some states were unwilling to provide
information, leading us to undercount the scope of SVP programs
nationally. External estimates tend to find much higher numbers
of commitments nationally, with less detail than is shown in our
data.73 These differences can be explained by a few factors. First,
the number of commitments has been growing since we collected
our data, and we do not adjust our numbers to reflect these
increases. In addition, we did not receive data from all SVP states,
73

See GOOKIN, supra note 7.
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and so we were forced to rely on data from alternative sources.
Because we segregate our analysis of confinement patterns from
our analysis of the impact of SVP passage on other outcomes, any
errors in the number of confinements do not affect our analyses of
crime and sexual abuse.

IV.

DID SVP LEGISLATION HAVE AN INCAPACITATION
EFFECT?

Although scholars recognize the importance of evaluating
whether SVP laws have had an impact on the incidence of sex
crimes, we are aware of no one who has done such an analysis.74
In this paper, we used recognized statistical techniques to
evaluate the impact of SVP laws on the incidence of sex crimes: a
difference-in-differences analysis and a panel data technique.
A.

Difference-in-Differences Analysis

First, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of
the effect of SVP passage on the rate of sex-related homicide,
forcible rape, and child sexual abuse. This approach examines
the difference in an outcome, on average, between SVP and
non-SVP states after SVP passage and measures that
difference against the benchmark of the analogous difference
between SVP and non-SVP states before SVP passage. The
74

See Jill S. Levenson & David D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent
Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 184 (2007).
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hope is that any differences between SVP and non-SVP states
in the incidence of the outcome that would be observed in the
absence of SVP passage are the same over time. Under that
assumption, the benchmark pre-passage difference between
SVP and non-SVP states measures the counterfactual
difference in outcomes after SVP passage, as if the SVP states
had never adopted SVP laws.
Florida has failed to provide figures to the SHR system
since 1996,75 and so we dropped it and designated the other
nineteen SVP states as treatment states. We designated the
thirty non-SVP states as the control group. Table 2 lists the
treatment states and the date of SVP passage.

Table 2. Treatment States by Date of SVP Passage

Next, we decided which years to designate as being
before and after treatment. We chose 1989 as our pretreatment year since it was prior to passage of all SVP
legislation. We chose 2009 as our post-treatment year since it is
the most recent year for which data is currently available.
1. Sex-Related Homicide
We then computed the mean rate of sex-related
homicides in treated and control states, between 1989 and
2009. As Table 3 below shows, the mean rate of sex-related
homicides dropped substantially in SVP states between 1989
and 2009 and much less substantially in non-SVP states over
the same period. This pattern leads to a superficial impression
that SVP passage may have led to fewer sex killings.
75

See National Center for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to the FBI’s
Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980 – 2010, Methods Section, Data Coverage (Accessed
7/18/2013, Last updated: 8/8/2012) http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/methods.asp
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Table 3. Mean Rate of Sex Homicides (per 100,000) in SVP and NonSVP States Between 1989 and 2009

This inference, however, is not justified upon closer
inspection of the data. Figure 2 gives the time series plot for sex
killings since 1976, separately for SVP and non-SVP states and
reveals three important patterns. First, sex killings have been in
secular decline since at least the mid-1970s. Second, this trend is
largely similar in both SVP and non-SVP states, which would not
occur if SVP laws were having an effect on the incidence of sex
killings. Third, 2008 and 2009 appear to be aberrant years for
non-SVP states, in the sense that sex killings are unusually high
in those years relative to 2006 and 2007, for example. In
particular, a difference-in-differences estimate based on 1989 and
2007 would have been consistent with no program effect, as
opposed to a decrease of 0.055 in the rate of sex killing.
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2. Forcible Rape
We turn now to the same research design for forcible
rape. For this measure, we have valid data for Florida, and so
each of the fifty states is represented. Again using 1989 and
2009 as reference years, we see that incidence of rape in SVP
states falls by 4.7 rapes per 100,000 after passage, and that the
incidence of rape in non-SVP states falls by 3.2 rapes per
100,000. This implies a difference-in-differences estimate of 1.5
fewer forcible rapes associated with SVP passage.

Table 4. Mean Rate of Forcible Rapes (per 100,000) in SVP and NonSVP States Between 1989 and 2009

As with our analysis of sex killings, however, a naïve
difference-in-differences estimate is misleading in this context
because the differences between SVP and non-SVP states in
the prevalence of rape are not time-invariant. Figure 3 plots
forcible rape in SVP and non-SVP states for the years 1960–
2009. These data indicate a high degree of fluctuation in the
gap seen in the incidence of rape between SVP and non-SVP
states prior to 1990. This empirical pattern falsifies the core
assumption of a difference-in-differences design.
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3. Child Sexual Abuse
We turn now to the same research design for child sexual
abuse. These data are available beginning in 1990, but for only a
subset of the states, and the most recent year available is
currently 2008. Table 5 shows the same difference-in-differences
analysis, but with a beginning year of 1990 and an ending year of
2008, for the states for which data is available.

Table 5. Mean Rate of Child Sexual Abuse (per 100,000) in SVP and
Non-SVP States Between 1990 and 2008

Similar to our analysis of forcible rape, however, a naïve
difference-in-differences estimate is misleading in this context
because the differences between SVP and non-SVP states in
the prevalence of child sexual abuse are not time-invariant.
Figure 4 plots child sexual abuse rates in SVP and non-SVP
states for 1990 to 2008. Data prior to SVP implementation are
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not available. This is unfortunate, as data prior to program
implementation are usually a key means of assessing the
comparability of states that do and do not adopt SVP statutes.
Nonetheless, this simple picture is useful for assessing the
hypothesis that SVP passage leads to increased safety, as
measured by the lack of child sexual abuse. Under a theory of
increased safety, we should expect to see a widening gap
between SVP and non-SVP states over time. First, more states
have adopted SVP statutes over time. Further, within each
state passing an SVP law, the program initially incapacitates a
small number of persons relative to a mature SVP program.76
Figure 4, however, does not indicate such a pattern and,
indeed, is somewhat suggestive of the opposite pattern.

Below, we subject the sex killing, forcible rape, and
childhood sexual abuse data to the more rigorous research
design of generalized difference-in-differences. That more
sophisticated analysis confirms the first impression of Figures
2, 3, and 4: namely, that there is little evidence SVP passage
had a discernible effect on sex crimes. In light of the
susceptibility of difference-in-differences to time-varying
disparities between SVP and non-SVP states, we defer an
analysis of gonorrhea rates until after we have described the
generalized difference-in-differences approach.

76

Cf. fig.1, supra.
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Panel Data Technique

Now, we focus on the generalized difference-indifferences technique first used by Louis Jacobson, Robert
LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan.77 Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan estimated the magnitude and temporal pattern of the
earnings lost by displaced Pennsylvania workers. One of us
(McCrary) used the same model to estimate the effect of courtordered hiring quotas on the racial composition of municipal
police departments.78 This technique is appropriate for
estimating the impact of SVP laws for two main reasons. First,
we have sex homicide and forcible rape data that spans a long
period of time, from 1976 to 2008. Second, the laws themselves
were passed in different states at different times. Both of these
factors are necessary for a sound implementation of the
generalized difference-in-differences methodology. A long time
period is necessary because the technique implicitly estimates
the effect of SVP passage, prior to its passage as well as
subsequent to its passage by examining the level of the
outcome—here, sex homicide and forcible rape—in the years
leading up to and subsequent to passage. Consequently, data
prior to the first passage date is desirable to obtain a robust
estimate of the “effect” of SVP passage prior to its passage, just
as data after the last passage date is desirable to obtain a
robust estimate of the effect of SVP passage subsequent to its
passage. Because the states passed the laws at different times,
the methodology is able to distinguish the effects of secular
changes—i.e., general national trends—in sex homicide and
forcible rape from the effects of SVP passage in specific.
The model can then standardize the date of SVP
passage for all states to time 0. For example, Washington
passed its SVP law in 1990 and California passed its SVP law
in 1995. Thus, 1990 will be equivalent to Time 0 for
Washington, and 1995 will be equivalent to time 0 for
California. Time 1 will reflect data from 1991 in Washington
and 1996 in California. Likewise, Time -1 will reflect data from
1989 in Washington and 1995 in California. We will then run a
series of regressions that estimate the difference in the rate of
sexual homicide, forcible rape, and child sexual abuse after the
77

Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel G. Sullivan, Earnings
Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON. REV. Vol. 685, 693 (1993).
78
Justin McCrary, The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the
Composition and Quality of Police, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 318, 318-20 (2007).
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passage of SVP legislation. One of the advantages of the
generalized difference-in-differences methodology is that it
legitimately enables us to make what is, at first blush, an
apples-to-oranges comparison of different states passing SVP
statutes in different years, but the methodology actually
presents a reliable apples-to-apples comparison of the average
experience of states in the first year after SVP passage, the
second year after SVP passage, and so on. The methodology
accomplishes this because different states are observed at
different calendar times and event study times. For example,
consider two states passing SVP statutes one year apart and
suppose that SVP passage lowers the outcome. Compared to the
later adopting state, the early adopting state should see declines
in the outcome earlier. With many states and many different
passage dates, these predictions become richer. The methodology
can see whether the patterns in the outcome accord with these
predictions and can choose the parameter estimates to best fit the
cross-state and cross-time pattern of the outcome.
1. Defining the Model
This model allows an estimation of the impact that SVP
laws have had on the rate of both sex-related homicide and
forcible rape.
The estimates correspond to least squares estimates of
θj in the regression model,
j
Yit = αi + βt + Σθj Dit + εit,
where the summation ranges over j, from -11 to 11, but
omitting the term corresponding to j=0. Yit denotes the rate of
j
sex killings or forcible rape in state i at time t, and Dit are leads
and lags of SVP passage. There are 11 leads and 11 lags. For a
j
< j < b, these are defined as Dit = Di1(t = Ti + j), where 1(A)
j
equals 1 if A is true and is 0 otherwise. For j=a, we define Dit
j
as Di1(t ≤ Ti + a), and for j=b, we define Dit =Di1(t ≥ Ti + b), as
this implies that the coefficients θj are measured in deviations
from the date of passage.79 The variable Di shows whether the
state ever passed SVP legislation. It is coded as a 1 for all SVP
states and a zero for non-SVP states. Ti gives the year that the
SVP legislation was passed. There are also dummy variables
for each year (βt) and each state (αi). Intuitively speaking, this
method allows for states to have different levels of the outcome
79

Id. at 330.
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(these are the state fixed effects, or the αi), for each year to
differ due to secular, or national, trends in the outcome (these
are the year fixed effects, or the βt), and for the effects of SVP
passage (these are the lead and lag coefficients, or the θj).
Although the x-axis in the event study graph stretches
from -10 to +10, the sample of states that drive the identification
of θj changes. Although all of the SVP states have data that
stretches back ten years before date of passage, only four
states—Kansas, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin—have
data that stretches forward ten years after date of passage.
2. Sexual Homicide
States like Washington and California enacted SVP
legislation in response to high profile sex crimes. The public
clamored for the government to protect them from dangerous
sexual predators, and the government responded by passing
SVP laws. Yet as Figure 5 shows, the rate of sex killings was
actually quite flat prior to the enactment of SVP legislation.
The interpretation of this figure is the same as that for Figure
1, discussed above. The open circles are estimates of the θj
parameters specified in the generalized difference-indifferences methodology. The dashed lines represent 95 percent
confidence intervals for the estimated θj parameters. These
indicate the degree of uncertainty associated with the
estimates because we have a sample of information, rather
than the whole universe of possible information. In repeated
instantiations of the sampling and measurement process, the
true θj parameters would lie inside these confidence intervals
95 percent of the time. As noted in the discussion of Figure 1,
pre-passage estimates are a robustness check on the
methodology and should be approximately zero if the date of
SVP passage is random, while post-passage estimates are our
best guess regarding the effect of SVP passage on the
outcome—here, the rate of sex killings.
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Figure 5 also shows the rate of sex killings after the
passage of SVP legislation. In theory, the rate of sex killings
could have dropped immediately, due to the increased
deterrent of the specter of spending life in a locked mental
hospital for a sex offense. It is of course also possible that sex
killings are less influenced by policy than by urges and
circumstances, in which case a deterrent effect might not have
been expected. Sex killings, however, might have also been
expected to decrease linearly due to SVP passage; this is, for
example, the natural implication of Figure 2, which shows that
commitments after SVP passage increased linearly.
Interestingly, however, Figure 5 provides no discernible
evidence that SVP passage led to either deterrence or
incapacitation. Deterrence would manifest itself by a
discontinuous shift down in the estimate immediately after
passage, whereas incapacitation would manifest itself by a
linear trend down following passage. Overall, the picture is
consistent with no statistically important change. The dashed
lines give twice standard error bands, which can be thought of
as a 95 percent margin of error on the solid line.
3. Forcible Rape
Figure 6 shows the same analysis, but applied to the
rate of forcible rape in SVP states before and after the passage
of the sexually violent predator laws. Before the passage of
SVP laws, the forcible rape rate is relatively flat. After the
passage of SVP laws, the rate appears to drop from year 1 to
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year 3, and then remains flat or declines slightly. The decline is
statistically indistinguishable from zero, since zero is within
the margin of error. As with the analysis of sex killings, the
data indicate that SVP laws have had no discernible deterrent
or incapacitation effects on the rate of forcible rape.

4. Childhood Sexual Abuse
Figure 7 shows the same analysis, but applied to the
rate of childhood sexual abuse in SVP states before and after
the passage of SVP laws. Before the passage of SVP laws, the
rate of childhood sexual abuse is relatively flat. After the
passage of SVP laws, the rate also appears flat, but bounces
above and below zero more often. These changes, however,
appear to have little structure to them. The data do not appear
to be consistent with either a discontinuous shift down in the
rate, nor with a shift downwards in the trend. Thus, as with
the analysis of sex killings, the data indicate that SVP laws
have had no discernible deterrent or incapacitation effect on
the rate of child sexual abuse.
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Corroboration: Event Study Estimates of the Impact of
SVP Law on Gonorrhea Rate

To corroborate these findings, we additionally examine, in
Figures 8 and 9, the patterns in the prevalence of gonorrhea
leading up to and subsequent to SVP law passage. Both figures
indicate that SVP laws have had no discernible impact on the
prevalence of sexual abuse.
As with previous findings, Figure 8 shows that SVP and
non-SVP states are generally different in terms of risk factors for
the types of crimes SVPs are thought to be at risk of committing.
In particular, SVP states have lower rates of forcible rape, child
sexual abuse, and gonorrhea, albeit similar—but low—rates of
sex killing.
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Figure 9 also reinforces the conclusions from the
preceding analysis. An incapacitation effect of SVP statutes on
child sexual abuse would be expected to lead to a break in the
trend of the gonorrhea coefficients following passage, specifically
a break in the negative direction. A deterrent effect of SVP
statutes on child sexual abuse would be expected to lead to a
drop in the gonorrhea coefficients immediately following
passage. Figure 9 gives no indication of either pattern. We
emphasize that only an incapacitation effect would be consistent
with the constitutional argument justifying SVP statutes.

D.

Summary of Findings

Undoubtedly, those confined under SVP programs are
prevented from committing crimes that would have been
committed had they not been imprisoned. But the social choice
is not between SVP programs and no SVP programs, but rather
between SVP programs and alternative programs that are
underfunded or not funded because of SVP outlays.80
We estimated two regression models to test the effect of
SVP laws on sex crimes. First, we used a difference-indifferences design to see whether the trends in sex-related
homicide, rape, and child sexual abuse in states with this new
legislation were different from the trends in states that did not
use these incapacitation innovations. Second, we used an event
80

Part VII, infra, details some of these tradeoffs including a dearth of funds for
testing rape kits and significant cuts in probation supervision and sex offender treatment.
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study estimate to see whether there was any impact upon the
rate of sex-related homicide, forcible rape, child sexual abuse,
or gonorrhea post passage of SVP laws. Neither approach
provides discernible evidence of preventive effects. Either there
are no preventive benefits associated with these laws, or the
benefits are too small to measure with these methods.
Proponents of SVP laws might respond that our study
failed to take into account the fact that some would-beoffenders simply moved to non-SVP states to avoid the threat of
lifetime incarceration for their crimes. If endogenous mobility
were an operative phenomenon, however, we would have
expected to see a decline in offense rates following SVP
passage. As previously noted, we did not see such a decline.
These results are especially significant considering the
hundreds of millions of dollars that have been allocated to expand
the prosecution of sex offenders across the country.81 Given the
additional resources devoted to arresting and prosecuting sex
offenders, it would make sense for the detection rate of sex crimes
to be higher; yet even in an atmosphere of increased sensitivity to
sex offenses, our analyses found no evidence that SVP laws had a
preventive effect.
V.

RECIDIVISM AND AGE

Although our findings may seem surprising, the results
are to be expected when the advanced age of SVPs is taken into
account. Studies show that, like other types of offenders, as sex
offenders age, their recidivism rate drops. Our data indicate
that the median age at admission for an SVP is roughly 43,
81

Garrine P. Laney, Violence Against Women Act: History and Federal
Funding (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1716&context=key_workplace. The STOP Program furthers a
coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to improving the criminal justice system’s
response to violent crimes against women. It does this by developing and strengthening
effective law enforcement and prosecution and strengthening victim services. For
instance, the program trains law enforcement, judges, court personnel, and prosecutors
to more effectively identify and respond to violent crimes against women, including
sexual assault. The 1994 Violence Against Women Act required each state to distribute 75
percent of its S.T.O.P. Program funds in equal parts to: law enforcement, prosecution, and
victim services. The use of the remaining 25 percent was discretionary, within parameters
defined by the law. The 2000 Violence against Women Act modified this allocation to
require that not less than 25% of STOP funds go to law enforcement, 25% to
prosecution, 30% to victim services and 5% to state and local courts, leaving 15%
discretionary. S.T.O.P. Annual Report 6 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovw/
214639.pdf. For a breakdown in the millions of dollars given to S.T.O.P. from 1999–
2003, see id. tbl.2. For a breakdown of more recent budgets, see Laney, supra, at 10-19
tbls.1 & 2.
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which is to be expected since SVP laws are targeted exclusively
at individuals about to be released from prison after serving
time for a new conviction or a parole violation. Yet targeting an
older population does not make much sense because as sex
offenders age, they actually pose less risk to society. In 2002,
Karl Hanson used data from ten follow-up studies of adult male
sex offenders ages 18–70+ (with a combined sample of 4673) to
study the relationship between age and sexual recidivism.82 He
found that, “In the total sample, the recidivism rate declined
steadily with age . . . [and t]he association was linear . . . .”83
Other researchers have come to similar results.84
Interestingly, advancing age seems to affect sex
offenders at different rates. Hanson found that the recidivism
rate of both incest offenders and rapists declined steadily over
time, and neither type of offender released after age 60
recidivated. Although the recidivism rate of extra-familial child
molesters also declined steadily with age, the drop was much
less dramatic until the offender reached age 49, when
recidivism dropped dramatically.85
The age effect exists even in high-risk offenders.86 In
2007, Prentky and Lee looked at the age effect on a group of
136 rapists and 115 child molesters who had been civilly
82

R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual
Offenders, 17 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 1046, 1048, 1056 (2002).
83
Id. at 1053.
84
See, e.g., Howard E. Babaree et al., Aging Versus Stable Enduring Traits
as Explanatory Constructs in Sex Offender Recidivism: Partitioning Actuarial
Prediction into Conceptually Meaningful Components, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 443,
461-63 (2009) (showing age at release provided unique and significant predictive
ability); Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The “Aging”
Offender and the Prediction of Reoffending in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26
JUST. Q. 828-56 (2009) (arguing that risk assessors should adjust the risk of
reoffending based on the offender’s age at release); Patrick Lussier et al., Criminal
Trajectories of Adult Sex Offenders and the Age Effect: Examining the Dynamic Aspect
of Offending in Adulthood, 20 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 147-68 (2010) (challenging the
conception of sex offenders’ risk as high, stable, and linear); Michelle L. Meloy, The Sex
Offender Next Door: An Analysis of Recidivism, Risk Factors, and Deterrence of Sex
Offenders on Probation, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 211, 222-23 (2005) (showing that
results indicate that under the right set of conditions, probation is the most
appropriate criminal sanction for some types of sex offenders); Richard Wollert et al.,
Recent Research (N = 9,305) Underscores the Importance of Using Age-Stratified
Actuarial Tables in Sex Offender Risk Assessments, 22 SEX ABUSE 47 (2010) (arguing
that “evaluators should report recidivism estimates from age-stratified tables when
they are assessing sexual recidivism risk, particularly when evaluating the aging sex
offender”).
85
See Hanson, supra note 82, at 1054.
86
See Robert A. Prentky & Austin Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release on Long Term
Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 43,
44 (2007).
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committed to a Massachusetts prison and were then followed
for 25 years.87 They found that with rapists, recidivism dropped
linearly as a function of age. With child molesters, however,
they found that recidivism increased from age 20 to age 40 and
then declined slightly at age 50 and significantly at age 60. As
Prentky and Lee point out, their sample is statistically small,
and it is comprised of offenders with a higher base rate of
recidivism than that of the general prison population:
Although this latter consideration might be regarded as a limitation
in terms of generalizability, it may also be seen as a strength of the
study. Presumably, using a higher risk sample is a more severe test
of the age-crime hypothesis, providing confirmatory support for the
rapists and “amplifying” or exaggerating the quadratic blip in
Hanson’s (2002) data for child molesters.88

VI.

PREDICTION PROBLEMS

It is possible that the reason we see no discernible
impact on the incidence of sex crimes is that because, even if
there is indeed a small group of dangerous sex offenders, the
state simply does not have the ability to identify those who are
risk of reoffending.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court merely assumed that
the state would be able to distinguish SVPs, but this is actually a
difficult task. Clinicians are not very good at predicting who will
re-offend,89 and so the state uses actuarial instruments like the
Static 99 at SVP commitment hearings. Even the best
instruments are only about 70 percent accurate, which results in
many false positives when used on a population that has a low
base rate of reoffending. If the explanation for our results is due
at least in part to the state’s inability to accurately predict who

87

Id. at 45, 50.
See id. at 58.
89
See generally, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR (1981); R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk
Assessment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 54 (1998) (arguing the research is more
useful for identifying high-risk offenders than for determining when they could be
safely released into the community); Vernon L. Quinsey & Rudolf Ambtman, Variables
Affecting Psychiatrists’ and Teachers’ Assessments of the Dangerousness of Mentally Ill
Offenders, 47 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 353 (1979) (arguing that
predictions of dangerousness are conservative and of low accuracy); Vernon L. Quinsey
& Anne Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients: Actuarial and Clinical
Predictions of Dangerousness, 1 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 143 (1986) (showing lack of
relation between clinical judgment model and outcome of re-offense).
88
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will reoffend, then this raises significant procedural due process
issues, which we will not be exploring in this article.90
VII.

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

We have shown that SVP laws had no discernible
impact on the incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child
sexual abuse, or gonorrhea. In addition to the constitutional
significance of these findings, they also have important public
policy implications. Given the high price tag for implementing
SVP laws, we believe states could more effectively fight sex
crimes by allocating scarce resources elsewhere.
In 2006, the total civil commitment budget across the
country equaled $454.7 million dollars, with SVP states
spending an average of $94,017 per year on each committed
SVP.91 California’s 2006 civil commitment budget was the
highest with a total of $147.3 million, and Texas—which
provided only outpatient care—spent the least at $1.2 million.92
Security and legal fees, including the cost for attorneys and
experts, are often not included, which means the total cost of
SVP programs is significantly higher than these figures
represent.93 In the state of Washington, for instance, the legal
fees per offender added up to $60,000 per year.94
To pay for SVP programs, some states have taken
measures such as reducing the number of probation officers,
even though at least one study showed that felony sex
offenders on probation have a lower recidivism rate than those
not on probation.95 Others have cut funding for domestic violence
and sexual violence prevention programs.96 Still others have

90

For a detailed analysis of this problem, see generally Lave, supra note 25.
See GOOKIN, supra note 7, at 5.
92
Id. at 5.
93
Id. at 1.
94
Id.
95
See Meloy, supra note 84, at 227.
96
See JANUS, supra note 9, at 115. Janus writes that in 2004, California
“spent more than $78 million to lock up 535 predators, while providing no substantial
sex offender treatment for the seventeen thousand sex offenders in its prisons . . . .” Id.
Janus also writes that in 2004, “Minnesota spent $26 million to lock up 235 predators.”
That same year, pecuniary problems forced the state to propose cutting 137 of its 778
police officers and to actually eliminate 100 probation officers’ positions despite rising
caseloads, and it cut its funding for domestic violence and sexual violence prevention
programs by $3.6 million per year. Id.
91
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slashed funding for sex offender treatment programs that have
been shown to reduce recidivism by as much as 30 to 40 percent.97
Perhaps most poignantly, the funds currently used to
pay for SVP programs could be directed toward the thousands
of rape kits that languish in police departments across the
country.98 According to a 2009 Human Rights Watch report, in
Los Angeles alone, there were at least 12,669 untested sexual
assault response team kits (known as SART or rape kits).99 In
order to test these kits, Los Angeles would need to hire
additional staff in their DNA laboratory at a cost of $1.6
million a year.100 Although the Los Angeles Police Department
has made some progress in reducing the number of unanalyzed
kits, the California budget crisis has led to mandatory work
furloughs that have slowed down these efforts.101
Not testing rape kits has serious consequences. Rape
kits often contain DNA and other physical evidence that can be
critical in identifying perpetrators—especially in cases where
the assailant is a stranger. Indeed, researchers have found that
prosecutors are more likely to file rape cases when there is
physical evidence.102 New York City’s experience illustrates the
crime-solving power of these kits. In 1999, the city decided to
eradicate the backlog of 16,000 untested rape kits in police
97

Id. at 115, 126 (describing lack of funding for sex offender treatment
programs in California and Massachusetts). Other researchers have also found that sex
offenders who complete sex offender treatment have lower recidivism rates than those
who do not. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MARSHALL ET AL., COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL
TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 157-58 (1999); Margaret A. Alexander, Sexual
Offender Treatment Efficacy Revisited, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE 101-16 (1999); Donna
Mailloux et al., Dosage of Treatment to Sexual Offenders: Are We Overprescribing?, 47 INT’L
J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 171-84 (2000); R. Karl Hanson et al.,
First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological
Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE 169, (2002).
98
In 2004, Congress passed the Debbie Smith Act as part of the Justice for
All Act, which was specifically created to provide federal funds so that state and local
law enforcement could test untested rape kits. Despite its stated purpose, the Act lets
states use the money to test any kind of DNA backlog, not just rape kits. Thus it is
hard to know how much money has actually been used to test rape kits. Perhaps this is
why the rape kits backlog continued to grow in Los Angeles despite millions of dollars
in Debbie Smith funding. HUMAN RTS. WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT
BACKLOG IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY 21, 29 (2009).
99
See id. at 1.
100
Id. at 32-33.
101
Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Backlog of Untested DNA Cases in Half, L.A. TIMES:
L.A. NOW BLOG (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/
10/lapd-cuts-backlog-of-untested-dna-cases-in-half-.html.
102
See Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in
Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461, 491 (2005).
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storage by 2003.103 As of January 2009, the tested kits had
resulted in 2000 cold hits104 and an additional 200 active
investigations, arrests, or prosecutions.105
If New York’s results are predictive for Los Angeles,
then testing L.A.’s kits should lead to approximately 1580 cold
hits and an additional 158 active investigations, arrests, or
prosecutions.106 Thus, instead of paying $166,000 per year to
lock up ten SVPs, California could reallocate those $1.6 million
to prosecute sixteen times as many rapists.107
VIII.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

We have shown that SVP laws have had no discernible
effect on the incidence of sexual homicide, forcible rape, child
sexual abuse, or gonorrhea. This finding is significant because
it challenges the only constitutionally permissible justification
for the laws: civil incapacitation of the dangerous mentally ill.
Our findings can also be used to mount a substantive due
process challenge to SVP laws. Since both types of challenge
require the Court to look independently at empirical findings,
we will begin by discussing judicial deference to legislative
findings of fact.
A.

Judicial Deference to Legislative Findings of Fact

Historically, the Court has been deferential to
Congressional and state legislative findings.108 When
constitutional rights are at stake, however, the Court should

103

See HUMAN RTS. WATCH, supra note 98, at 55.
A cold hit refers to when DNA evidence from a suspect-less rape case is
linked to the DNA profile of a particular person. See S. REP. NO. 107-334, at 11 (2002),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107srpt334/pdf/CRPT-107srpt334.pdf
Although critical, a cold hit is just the first step in the investigatory process. For
instance, law enforcement must get a confirmatory DNA sample from the suspect, and
ideally, law enforcement will get the chance to interview the suspect. Id.
105
HUMAN RTS. WATCH, supra note 98, at 55.
106
12,669 / 16,000 = .79; .79 x 2,000 = 1,580; .79 x 200 = 158.
107
1.6 million / 166,000 = 9.64; 158 / 9.64 = 16.46. It costs $47,102 per year to
imprison someone in California; thus, 3.5 for these rapists could be incarcerated for the
price of one SVP. Legislative Analyst’s Office, Criminal Justice and Judiciary: How Much
Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?: California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in
Prison, 2008–09, LAO.GOV, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim_justice/
6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (166,000 / 47,102 = 3.52).
108
See Borgmann, supra note 32, at 6-7; Neal Devins, Congressional
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J.
1169, 1178-81 (2001).
104
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maintain a more detached and critical perspective,109 as it
acknowledged: “Although we review congressional factfinding
under a deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances
here place dispositive weight on Congress’ findings. The Court
retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”110 The
Supreme Court has recognized that constitutional rights are at
stake in SVP commitment, stating, “[i]t is clear that commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process protection.”111 Consequently, the
Court has a duty to independently review the finding that
SVPs are extremely dangerous since that finding provides the
factual groundwork for the legislation’s civil classification.112
Although the Court has not always undertaken such a
review when fundamental rights are at stake, it should
certainly do so here.113 First, the people whose rights are being
taken away are sex offenders, and they are one of the most
loathed groups in the country. It would be political suicide for
legislators to challenge commonly held beliefs about sex
offenders, and so public choice theory tells us they will not
tackle this issue.114 In factual disputes over highly contentious
issues like this one, courts are in a better position than
legislatures to demand claims be proven true instead of merely
presumed true.115 Judges are less beholden to the populace
because many have lifetime appointments, and they can slow
proceedings down to allow the presentation of complicated and
nuanced evidence.116
Furthermore, there was no real factual finding
regarding the dangerousness of so-called SVPs; that they were
extremely dangerous was just assumed to be true. Thus, we are
not asking the Court to reconsider evidence that was presented
but deemed insufficient; instead, we are asking the Court to
109

But see Borgmann, supra note 32, at 78 (arguing that the Court does not
always defer when it is supposed to or remain critical when it is supposed to).
110
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007).
111
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citations omitted).
112
Caitlin E. Borgmann calls these “‘dispositive’ social facts,” and she
describes them as “the plainly empirical as opposed to doctrinal issues that a decision
maker must resolve before determining a law’s constitutionality.” Borgmann, supra
note 32, at 5.
113
See id. at 21-28.
114
See generally 1 CHARLES K. ROWLEY, PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY (1993).
115
Devins, supra note 108, at 1185-87.
116
Id. at 1182-87; Borgmann, supra note 32, at 21-46.
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consider evidence that was not even available at the time it
decided Hendricks. This is exactly the kind of research that
Chief Judge Posner requested fourteen years ago: “I would like
to see the legal professoriat redirect its research and teaching
efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise of social
science, and by doing this make social science a better aid to
judges’ understanding of the social problems that get thrust at
them in the form of constitutional issues.”117
B.

Legitimacy of Empirical Studies in Constitutional
Analysis

Our request of the Court is nothing new; there is
precedent for using empirical studies to challenge the
constitutionality of a particular law, even when it requires
overturning legislative findings of fact.118 In a span of less than
twenty-five years, the Court went from holding that execution of
16- and 17-year-olds did not violate the Eighth Amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment119 to holding that
mandatory life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for
juveniles who had been convicted of homicide did.120
Scientific studies of the developing adolescent brain led
the Court to overturn its own precedent as well as factual
findings of various lower courts and legislatures. In 1989, the
Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that executing 16- and 17year-olds did not violate the Constitution.121 In his majority
opinion, Justice Scalia was openly dismissive of the studies
presented regarding the cognitive and emotional development
of juveniles. As he explained, “The battle must be fought, then,
on the field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle
socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific
117

Posner, supra note 2, at 12.
See e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (where
the Court held that segregated public school education violated the Equal Protection
Clause). In coming to this conclusion, the Court contradicted specific findings to the
contrary by state legislatures and courts. Indeed, in Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), the Court had held that “separate but equal” did not violate equal protection.
Key to the Court’s decision in Brown were psychological studies that showed the
detrimental impact of segregated education on minority children. The Court held that these
studies were relevant regardless of whether they had existed at the time Plessy was decided.
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
119
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
120
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
121
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
118
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evidence is not an available weapon.”122 Just sixteen years later,
the Court pointed to “scientific and sociological studies” in
striking down the juvenile death penalty in Roper v.
Simmons.123 By 2010, the Court was specifically citing brain
imaging in its decision that LWOP for juveniles not guilty of
murder violated the Eighth Amendment,124 and brain studies also
figured in the Court’s 2012 holding that mandatory LWOP for
juveniles guilty of murder violated the Eighth Amendment.125
The studies that ended up proving so influential to the
Court were due in large part to advances in brain imaging
technology which allowed scientists to observe that the adolescent
brain was still developing until a person was in his or her mid20s, including in areas of the brain that governed impulse
control, reasoning, and judgment.126 These findings contradicted
conventional wisdom that the brain had finished developing in
early childhood. It led advocates to contend that juveniles
should not be punished in the same way as adults because
their impulsivity made them less culpable and because they
were likely to be able to learn from their mistakes.127
122
123
124

Id. at 378.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
As the Court wrote in Graham v. Florida,

No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper
about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
125
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court pointed to the importance of studies on
adolescent brain development in its jurisprudence on the juvenile death penalty. 132 S.
Ct. 2455 (2012). It then quoted several amici briefs and concluded, “The evidence
presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social science supporting
Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger.” Id. at 2464 n.5.
126
See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Death Penalty, 13
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 119-22 (2007).
127
See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Developments in Criminal and Evidence Law:
Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the Court’s “Kids are
Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the
Court’s changing jurisprudence towards children and arguing that under principles of
penal proportionality, all adolescent punishment should be mitigated by the fact that
juveniles lack the fully developed decision making capacity of adults); Jeffrey Fagan,
Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exception
for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207 (2003) (arguing that the
Court’s rationale for outlawing execution of the mentally retarded on the grounds of
diminished culpability should apply to juveniles as well); Barry C. Feld, Competence,
Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing
Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463 (2003) (contending that the same psychological
and developmental characteristics that render mentally retarded offenders less
blameworthy than competent adult offenders also characterize the immaturity of
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Now that we have discussed the Court’s authority and
responsibility to review legislative findings of fact, we turn to the
relevance of our findings to the constitutionality of SVP legislation.
C.

Double Jeopardy

SVP laws allow the state to use civil law to lock people
away in what constitutes the functional equivalent of
punishment. Because SVP laws are specifically targeted at
those who have served their maximum prison sentence, the
classification of the law as civil or criminal is critical. The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments bar the state from punishing a
person twice for the same crime, and so if the law were
criminal, it would constitute an impermissible second
punishment. If the law is civil, however, the state may continue
to detain these individuals because the prohibition on double
jeopardy does not apply.
On appeal, Leroy Hendricks challenged the civil
classification of the Kansas SVP law. While acknowledging
that “a civil label is not always dispositive,”128 the Court
nonetheless stated that showing a statute establishes criminal
proceedings constitutes a “heavy burden.”129 In its opinion, the
Court stated, “we will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only
where a party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof’
that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’”130
The challenger rarely prevails in these sorts of cases,131
and Hendricks was no exception. The Court accepted the
judgment and reduced culpability of adolescents and should likewise prohibit their
execution, and more broadly, that because the generic culpability of adolescents differs
from that of responsible adults, penal proportionality requires formal, categorical
recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
128
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (citation omitted).
129
Id.
130
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248-49 (1980)).
131
See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding that Fifth
Amendment protections did not apply to proceedings under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act because, although they were similar to criminal proceedings in
that they were accompanied by strict procedural safeguards, they were essentially civil
in nature); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings were civil and not criminal); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242
(1980) (holding that a civil penalty assessed for violations of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act was civil and insufficiently punitive to require Fifth Amendment
protections). But see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that
two federal statutes which stripped American citizenship from individuals evading
military service were punitive in nature and thus unconstitutional because they
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state’s classification of the law as civil in large part because the
justices simply accepted as true the empirical claim that SVPs
are “extremely dangerous.” The rationale could not be
deterrence, the Court reasoned, because SVPs cannot be
deterred. Nor could it be retributive because the only purpose for
introducing the prior criminal history was to show the presence
of a mental order or dangerousness. Here, the Court simply
begged the question—their prior history is used to prove what
they already believe to be true. Furthermore, the fact that
Kansas’ civil commitment scheme involved an indefinite
affirmative restraint did not alter the Court’s holding because
the legislative findings justified it. As the Court saw it, “Far
from any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is
instead linked to the stated purposes of the commitment,
namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no
longer causes him to be a threat to others.”132
In analyzing whether the SVP law is really criminal, we
took a different tack. Mindful of the inherent difficulties in
trying to assess the actual motives of legislators at the time
they pass a law,133 we assumed their stated motivation
accurately reflected their intent. Instead, we looked at whether
empirical evidence ruled out their rationale. Ironically, this
was what the majority in Hendricks did when dismissing
deterrence as a possible rationale; the difference is that they
assumed certain empirical evidence to be true, and we did not.
We asked what the world would look like if SVPs were as
dangerous as the legislature claimed them to be and then saw
whether that description proved to be accurate. In conducting
this inquiry, we used information that was neither available at
the time the law was enacted nor when the Court decided
Hendricks.
The Kansas legislature premised its SVP law on the fact
that they were incapacitating “[a] small but extremely
dangerous group . . . [whose] likelihood of engaging in repeat

imposed punishment without providing the protections required by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994) (holding that less deference is appropriate when a single judge declares a
particular sanction to be civil and that serious contempt fines are criminal and
constitutionally can not be imposed absent a jury trial).
132
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.
133
“Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous
matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a
dubious affair indeed.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
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acts of predatory sexual violence is high.”134 If SVPs were as
dangerous as the legislature described, we would expect that
their civil commitment would have an impact on the incidence
of violent sex crime. Yet we find that SVP laws have had no
discernible impact. Our findings are significant because they
challenge the legislature’s rationale for the law. If the state
cannot justify its law on incapacitation grounds, then it must
provide another reason for locking these individuals away
indefinitely—under the constraints imposed by the Constitution.
Arguing that they deserve additional custody to pay for their
crimes is an unacceptable alternative. Sending a message to
deter would-be offenders is also off the table. Both these
reasons are punitive, and they violate double jeopardy.
D.

Substantive Due Process

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”135
For this reason, the Constitution strictly limits civil
commitment to individuals who are both mentally ill and
dangerous.136 Although the Court held in Hendricks that the
SVP law in Kansas did not violate substantive due process,
that challenge was based on whether mental abnormality
constituted mental illness.137 We believe that our findings can
serve as the basis for a due process challenge on other grounds,
namely that so-called SVPs are not sufficiently dangerous to
justify indefinite, involuntary commitment.
SVP laws clearly infringe upon a fundamental liberty
interest. The Court has recognized that indefinite, involuntary
civil commitment to a locked mental institution constitutes a
“significant deprivation”138 and “massive curtailment”139 of
liberty. Indeed, the Court began its analysis in Hendricks by
recognizing that “freedom from physical restraint ‘has always
134

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-21a01 (1994)).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). The Court has also
recognized that an individual will suffer significant adverse consequences if he is
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Id. at 425-26.
136
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).
137
Hendricks argued that his Due Process rights were violated because a
mental abnormality did not constitute mental illness. The Court disagreed stating that, “the
term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
138
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
139
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
135
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been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.’”140 The liberty
interest at stake in SVP commitment involves both the freedom
from bodily restraint141 and the freedom from indefinite,
involuntary commitment in a mental institution.142 The loss of
liberty goes beyond a freedom from confinement to include the
stigma associated with such confinement, or as the Court put
it, “adverse social consequences . . . that . . . can have a
significant impact on the individual.”143
Because SVP laws infringe on fundamental rights, they
are subject to heightened scrutiny. In Reno v. Flores, the Court
laid out how heightened scrutiny applies to a substantive due
process claim: “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’
guarantee of ‘due process of law’ . . . include[s] a substantive
component, which forbids the government to infringe certain
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.”144 Another articulation of the strict
scrutiny standard requires that “the law . . . advance a compelling
state interest by the least restrictive means available.”145 We
recognize that although strict scrutiny is a demanding standard,
it by no means implies a death knell for legislation.146
Protecting people from dangerous sex offenders clearly
constitutes a “compelling government interest,” but our
findings show that locking up adjudicated SVPs is not
“narrowly tailored” to meet this goal. The lack of an
incapacitation effect means that we are indefinitely confining
many people who are at low risk of committing a violent sexual
offense if released. Our findings show that SVP legislation is
neither “carefully limited”147 regarding the circumstances under

140

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356 (quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80).
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
142
Id. at 82.
143
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492.
144
507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
145
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
146
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); see
also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 808-09 (2006) (finding that courts
do not always strike down statutes under strict scrutiny and sometimes strike down
statutes under rational review).
147
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
141
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which detention is allowed, nor “sharply focused”148 on the
problem of preventing violent sex crimes. Instead, we show
that SVP legislation is just a “scattershot attempt”149 at
addressing a serious problem that results from the indefinite
commitment of many people who would not reoffend.
Furthermore, our findings show that SVP laws do not
comport with the level of dangerousness required to justify
indefinite civil commitment. The state of Kansas had argued
that it should not have to prove that a person had difficulty
controlling his dangerous behavior in order to commit him as
an SVP, but the Court held otherwise in Kansas v. Crane150:
We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim
that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous
sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control
determination. Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance
of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil
commitment “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” That
distinction is necessary lest “civil commitment” become a
“mechanism for retribution or general deterrence”—functions
properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment.151

Instead, the Court held that the demands of due process
required the state to prove that the person has a “mental
abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it “difficult,
if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his
dangerous behavior.”152 The Court further described that “[t]he
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist
convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”153
Our findings show that this threshold for dangerousness
has not been met. If the state was successfully locking up only
those who had a difficult if not impossible time refraining from
committing violent sex crimes, then there should be an
incapacitation effect. The lack of such an effect as demonstrated

148

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (describing the pre-trial
detention scheme which the Court upheld in Salerno, 481 U.S. 739).
149
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
150
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002).
151
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997)).
152
Id. at 411 (alteration in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
153
Id. at 413.
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by our data suggests that the state is locking up people who are
equally or even less dangerous than the typical recidivist.
CONCLUSION
SVP laws are premised on incapacitating dangerous sex
offenders who would be committing sexually violent crimes if
they were released into the community after serving their
prison terms. One way of testing this theory is to see whether
the rates of sex killing, forcible rape, and child sexual abuse
change after the passage of SVP laws. If the offenders truly are
as dangerous as the law purports, we would expect sex crime
rates to drop post-passage.
In this article, we analyzed that theory from three
different perspectives. First, we ran a difference-in-differences
regression. We found that there is no statistically significant
change in the incidence of sex homicide, forcible rape, or child
sexual abuse post passage. We then ran a disparate impact
analysis and once again found that SVP laws have had no
noticeable effect on the rate of sex killing, forcible rape, or child
sexual abuse. Finally, we analyzed whether SVP laws have had
an impact on the incidence of gonorrhea, and we find that they
have not.
In a sense, the small number of committed SVPs stacks
the deck against conventional tests of statistical significance on
issues such as homicides resulting from sex crimes and even
forcible rape. There are only a few thousand SVPs incarcerated
in the United States as compared to over a million persons
locked up in conventional prisons. There are, however, two
reasons why a sustained analysis of the impact of this
legislation on sex crime rates is an indispensable part of any
comprehensive analysis of such laws. First, despite the small
number of persons confined, the aggregate costs of this strategy
are relatively substantial. As noted above, implementing these
laws costs hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and this
high cost has forced some states to reduce funding for law
enforcement and violence prevention programs.154 Nowhere is
this borne out more than in the untested rape kits. As the
analysis above showed, instead of paying $166,000 a year per
detainee to lock up ten SVPs, California could reallocate that
$1.6 million to prosecute sixteen times as many rapists.
154

See supra Part VII.
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Second, as difficult as the prospect of a visible
preventive effect may be, it is the only constitutionally
acceptable rationale for enacting SVP laws and confining those
deemed to be SVPs for lengthy periods of time. The only other
possible justification—that these individuals deserve to be
punished because they did bad things—would violate the
Constitution’s double jeopardy prohibition.155 Thus, prevention
is not merely the most important objective of SVP strategy; it is
the only legitimate objective.
All of the empirical indicators developed in this article
are consistent with the proposition that SVP laws do not
demonstrably prevent sex killing, forcible rape, or child sexual
abuse. Of course, there can be no formal proof of zero
effectiveness in the real world. Yet in light of the considerable
costs of these laws, both in terms of the opportunity costs to the
states and the lost liberty to the individuals, states would be
wise to consider suspending the laws unless and until they
prove effective.
More significantly, in light of the fact that our findings
undermine the only constitutionally permissible justification
for SVP laws, we believe that states and the federal
government should either definitively demonstrate that there
is an incapacitation effect from these laws or suspend them
immediately. We recognize, however, that our findings may not
be strong enough for a court to find that we have met the
“heavy burden” in showing that SVP legislation should be
considered criminal. For that reason, our substantive due
process analysis gains enormous significance. Because SVP
laws infringe on fundamental rights, they are subject to
heightened scrutiny, and the burden is on the government to
show that the infringement on liberty is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. Our findings show that SVP states
are confining many individuals who are not dangerous, and are
certainly no more dangerous than the typical recidivist. Thus,
the government is clearly not able to meet its burden.

155

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 374 (1984).
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